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ABSTRACT
Acountry's most talented people typically organize
production by others, so they can spread their ability advantage
over a larger scale. When they start firms, they innovate and
foster growth, but when they become rent seekers, they only
redistribute wealth and reduce growth. Occupational choice
depends on returns to ability and to scale in each sector, on
market size, and on compensation contracts. In most countries,
rent seeking rewards talent more than entrepreneurship does,
leading to stagnation. Our evidence shows that countries with a
higher proportion of engineering college majors grow faster;
whereas countries with a higher proportion of law concentrators
grow slower.
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When they are free to do so, people choose occupations that offer them the
highest returns on their abilities. The most able people then choose occupations that
exhibit increasing returns to ability, since increasing returns allow "superstars" to earn
extraordinary returns on their talent [Rosen, 1981]. In these occupations, being
slightly more talented enables a person to win a tournament, to capture a prize, to
become promoted, or otherwise to gain a lot by being slightly better than the next
person. For example, since everyone wants to listen to the best singer, she can earn a
lot more than a marginally inferior singer, especially with records and tapes. In
occupations with increasing returns to ability, absolute advantage is the critical
determinant of pay.
Some people have strong comparative advantage from natural talent for
particular activities, such as singing, painting or basketball. These people can earn
vastly more by practicing these occupations than any others. But other people do not
have such great specialized abilities, but at the same time possess great intelligence,
energy or other generally valuable traits. Such people can become one of the best in
many occupations, unlike the best singer or basketball player. They can become
entrepreneurs, government officials, lawyers, speculators, clerics, etc. All these
occupations exhibit increasing returns to ability, in that having marginally greater
talent leads to a significantly higher payoff. The most able people then choose
occupations where returns to being a superstar are the highest. In this paper, we
discuss what determines their choices, and then argue theoretically and empirically
that the allocation of talent has significant effects on the growth rate of an economy.3
What determines the attractiveness of an occupation to talent? First, the size of
the market is crucial: being a superstar in a large market pays more than being a
superstar in a small market and so will draw general talent. A person of great
general athietic ability, for example, would rather be the 10th best tennis player than
the first best volleyball player, since far fewer people would pay to watch him play
volleyball. Second, attractive activities have weak diminishing returns to scale. A
superstar would want to spread her ability advantage over as large a share of the
market as possible, but is limited by constraints on her time, physical ability, and
more generally the size of the firm she can run. A surgeon can operate, at most, 16
hours a day, unless of course she can teach others to use the procedure and reap a
return on their time. In contrast, an inventor who can embody her idea in a product
overcomes the constraints on her physical time, but is still limited by the size of the
firm she can run. Because of stronger diminishing returns to scale, even the most
successful doctors do not make as much money as successful entrepreneurs. The
faster returns to scale in an activity diminish, the less attractive it is to a person of
high ability.
Finally, the compensation contract--how much of the rents on their talent the
superstars can capture--determines the sector's attractiveness to talent. For example.
if returns to innovation are not protected by patents and cannot be captured by an
entrepreneur, entrepreneurship becomes less attractive. When individual output is
difficult to measure or is not sufficiently rewarded when measured, talented people
are underpaid. Teamwork without attribution is unattractive to superstars, as is
horizontal equity. The more of the rents on her talent a superstar can keep, the
more likely she is to join a sector.4
In different countries and time periods, talented people chose occupations in
which it was the most attractive to be a superstar. When markets in a country are
large and when people can easily organize firms and keep their profits, many talented
people become entrepreneurs. Examples of such countries might be Great Britain
during the Industrial Revolution, the United States in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, and some East Asian countries today. In many other countries,
talented people do not become entrepreneurs, but join the government bureaucracy,
army, organized religion, and other rent seeking [Tullock, 1967; Krueger, 1974]
activities because these sectors offer the highest prizes. In Mandarin China, Medieval
Europe, and many African countries in this century, government service, with the
attendant ability to solicit bribes and dispose of tax revenue for the benefit of one's
family and friends, was the principal career for the most able people in the society
[Baumol, 1990]. In Latin America and parts of Africa today as well as in many other
countries through history, the most talented people often joined the army as a way to
access the resources from their own countries (as well as from foreign conquests). In
eighteenth century France, the best and the brightest also became rent seekers. The
great chemist Lavoisier's main occupation was tax collecting, and Tallevrand was a
bishop with a large tax income despite his prodigious entrepreneurial skills shown
when he escaped to the United States after the French revolution. These examples
show that in fact talent is often general rather than occupation-specific, and therefore
its allocation is governed not just by comparative advantage but also by returns to
absolute advantage in different sectors.
Which activities the most talented people choose can have significant effects on
the allocation of resources. When they become entrepreneurs, they improve the5
technologyin the line of business they pursue, and as a result, productivity and
income grow. In contrast, when they become rent seekers, most of their private
returns come from redistribution of wealth from others and not from wealth creation.
As a result, talented people do not improve technological opportunities, and the
economy stagnates. Landes [1969] believes that the differential allocation of talent is
one of the reasons why England had the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth
century but France did not. In more recent times, the allocation of talent to the rent-
seeking sectors might be the reason for stagnation in much of Africa and Latin
America, for slow growth in the United States, and for success of newly industrializing
countries where these sectors are smaller.
The allocation of talent to rent seeking is damaging for several reasons. First, as
the rent-seeking sectors expand, they absorb labor and other resources and so reduce
income. The enormous size of government bureaucracies in some LDCs illustrates
this effect. Second, the tax imposed by the rent-seeking sector on the productive
sector reduces incentives to produce, and therefore also reduces income. A striking
example of this is the difficulty of starting a firm in today's Peru described in
Dc Soto's [1989] The Other Path. Finally, if the most talented people become rent
seekers, the ability of entrepreneurs is lower, and therefore the rate of technological
progress and of growth is likely to be lower. The flow of some of the most talented
people in the United States today into law and financial services might then be one of
the sources of our low productivity growth. When rent-seeking sectors offer the most
able people higher returns than productive sectors, income and growth can be much
lower than possible.
The sharp distinction we draw between productive and rent-seeking activities is6
exaggerated. Pure entrepreneurial activities raise current income because resources
are used more efficiently, contribute to growth because technology is improved, and
take profits away from competitors. Or take the case of traders in financial markets.
Trading probably raises efficiency since it brings security prices closer to their
fundamental values. It might even indirectly contribute to growth if more efficient
financial markets reduce the cost of capital. But the main gains from trading come
from the transfer of wealth to the smart traders from the less astute whotradewith
them out of institutional needs or outright stupidity. Even though efficiency improves,
transfers are the main source of returns in trading. The same is true for some kinds
of law, such as divorce and contract law, the army and the police in some countries,
and to some extent organized religion. Although few activities are pure rent seeking
or pure efficiency-improving, the general point remains: talent goes into activities with
the highest private returns, which need not have the highest social returns.
Olson [1982] also addresses the relationship between rent seeking and growth.
His idea is that "cumulative distortions" due to rent seeking reduce growth. Olson
does not deal with the allocation of talent. Magee, Brock and Young [1989] discuss
rent seeking in great detail and present a model of the allocation of labor between
rent seeking and production. Likeus,they present some evidence that la'ers have a
detrimental effect on growth, using different data. They do not focus on the
allocation of talent. Baumol [1990] makes the same basic point as we do that
entrepreneurship can be "productive" or "unproductive," and the allocation of people
between the two activities depends on the relative returns and provides many
interesting historical examples. The ideas of our paper were developed
independently. In particular, Baumol does not discuss the role of increasing returns7
to ability in explaining why rent seeking and productive entrepreneurship are in fact
competing for the vex-v same people, who are the most able in the society.
Section I of the paper presents a one-sector model of entrepreneurship and
growth and discusses the increasing returns to ability that draw the most able people
into entrepreneurship. We abstract from alternative uses of high ability to stress the
importance for growth of allocating talent into the entrepreneurial activities.
Section II then considers the allocation of talent between two sectors with increasing
returns to ability. It also explains why talented people may be drawn into sectors
which experience an improvement in technology or an increase in demand, making
growth in these sectors self-sustaining. Section III introduces pure rent seeking as an
alternative activity with increasing returns to ability, and shows when the most able
people switch to rent seeking. We also discuss the implications of rent seeking for
growth. Section IV presents some evidence on the effect of lawyers and engineers on
growth. Section V concludes.
L Entrepreneurship and Growth: A One-Sector Model
This section presents a model of entrepreneurship and growth. The model is
based on Lucas [1978] and has been previously used by Kuhn [1988]. In the model,
high ability people become entrepreneurs and hire low ability people in their firms.
When they do, they improve the current productive techniques. As the improvement
of the technique is imitated, everyone's productivity rises and income grows. In the
model we set up, the rate of technological progress and of income growth is
determined by the ability of the most able person engaged in entrepreneurship. The
model thus illustrates the importance for growth of allocating the most able people toS
the productive sector of the economy.
We assume that there is a distribution of abilities in the population, with the
support of [1,aj and the density function f(A). We measure a person's ability by how
much he can improve the technology he operates. Ability in our model is
unidimensional: we do not address the allocation of people to jobs because of
particular aptitude in those jobs. Each person is alive for one period and the
distribution of abilities is the same each period.
We assume that there is only one good in the economy, which is produced by
many finns. Each firm is organized by an entrepreneur. If a firm is organized by an
entrepreneur with ability A, its profits are given by
(1)y=sAF(1-fl-wH,
where s is the common state of technology, F is the constant over time production
function, H is theaggregate humancapital (ability) of all the workers employed by
this entrepreneur, w is the workers' wage, and the price of the good is normalized to
be 1. We can think of s A as the productivity parameter of the firm, where s is the
public level of technology and A is the entrepreneur's contribution. The entrepreneur
takes the current state of technology s and the wage w as given. F is a standard
concave production function.
The profit function (1) builds in our key assumptions. The more able
entrepreneurs can earn more than proportionately to their ability higher profits from
operating the same technology as the less able entrepreneurs. This is because their
output and therefore revenues rise with their ability but their costs do not. There is,
therefore, an increasing return to ability. This assumption makes it more attractive9
for the most able people to become entrepreneurs, for two reasons. First, they can
earn more than proportionately higher profits for a fixed size of the firm H. Second,
the more able expand the size of the firm so that they can spread their ability
advantage over a larger scale. The concavity of the production function F determines
how strongly the returns diminish with scale, and so measures how much one can
benefit from high ability.
The first-order condition with respect to H is given by
(2) s A F'(H) =w,
so the more able people, obviously, run larger firms. In the extreme case of constant
returns to scale, the most able entrepreneur captures the whole market. In the case
of diminishing returns, his ability to expand is limited but he still runs a larger firm.
Each person in the model lives for one period. He decides whether to become
an entrepreneur or a worker, If he becomes an entrepreneur, he picks the size of his
firm H(A) according to (2), and then earns a profit as in (1). If he becomes a
worker, he earns w• A. We have the increasing return to ability in entrepreneurship
since someone with double the ability earns doubte the income as a worker, but more
than double the income as an entrepreneur for a fixed firm size. In fact, what
matters here is that returns to ability in entrepreneurship relative to other work be
increasing.
A person becomes an entrepreneur when
(3) SAF(H(A))-w'H(A)>w•A,
and a worker otherwise. The more able people become entrepreneurs in equilibrium.10
and the less able ones become workers. There is a cutoff ability A* such that those
with higher ability become entrepreneurs and those with lower ability become
workers.
The demand for workers by entrepreneurs must equal the supply of workers
a
(4) f Af(A)dA =fH(A)f(A)dA
1
Equation (4) describes how the real wage adjusts. If there are too many workers and
too few entrepreneurs, there is excess supply of labor and so the best workers want to
switch to entrepreneurship. Conversely, if there are too few workers, the wage is high
and the marginal entrepreneurs would rather become workers.
To specify the growth model, we need to describe the evolution of technology s.
We assume that the state of technology today is the state last period times the ability
of the most able entrepreneur last period
(5) s(t) =s(t-1)(maximum ability of an entrepreneur at t -1).
This assumption says that last period's best practice becomes common knowledge this
period and is therefore accessible to any entrepreneur, who can then improve on it.
The constantly improving technology generates permanent growth in our model. In
addition, the assumption that the entrepreneur does not capture the future returns
from his innovation builds in the standard externality, as in Arrow [1962]. As in
Arrow, this assumption generates inefficiency in some versions of the model.
The model we presented does not distinguish between innovation and running
firms. In fact, they are distinct activities and in principle can be done by different11
people. In this case, how the returns from innovation and managing are divided can
influence the willingness of people to become innovators. This is one of the examples
of how contracting can influence the allocation of talent. Historical experience,
especially from the British Industrial Revolution, shows that the two functions
(innovation and management) have vety often been combined in the same person,
suggesting that the problem of splitting the rewards is substantial enough to overcome
the forces of comparative advantage.
This model is essentially static, since agents take the state of technology as given.
The equilibrium is easy to describe. Each period, all agents with ability above A
become entrepreneurs. and those below A* become workers. The profit function and
the income of workers are homogeneous in s and w, which means that A* is constant
over time. The same part of the distribution becomes entrepreneurs each period.
Technology, wages, profits, and income per capita all grow at the constant rate a -1
given by the ability of the best entrepreneur. This person determines the rate of
growth of this economy.
The allocation of resources in this economy is first-best efficient. This means
both that the growth rate is efficient, and that the cutoff ability level A between
entrepreneurs and workers is efficient. The latter result obtains because both the
social and the private product of the least able entrepreneur is exactly equal to his
wage as a worker. The efficiency of the growth rate is very special: it is a
consequence of having only one sector and not having any effort supply decisions by
entrepreneurs that might be distorted. At the same time, the flavor of the result that
more talented people are allocated to entrepreneurial activities with beneficial
consequences for growth is going to be preserved in more general specifications.12
This simple model illustrates several general principles. First, the most able
people in the society enter occupations where they can take advantage of increasing
returns to ability. In this model, there is only one such activity—entrepreneurship—and
so the question of which sector with increasing returns to ability to enter does not
arise. When the most able people become entrepreneurs, they organize production
and improve the available techniques. Second, the growth rate of the economy is
determined by the ability of the entrepreneurs. It is therefore essential for growth
that the most able people turn to entrepreneurship. Next, we examine the
implications of introducing an alternative sector that competes for the talents of the
entrepreneurs.
IL A Two-Sector Model
In this section we discuss the allocation of talent between sectors. The
determinant of attractiveness of a sector that we model formally is the extent of
diminishing returns to scale. Nonetheless, in interpreting the results, it is important to
remember that market size and contracts also affect the allocation of talent.
Suppose that there are two sectors rather than one. Each sector has its own
concave production function, but they are identical in all the other respects. Suppose
also that preferences are Cobb-Douglas, so that the same fixed share of income is
spent on a given good each period. Denote the share of income spent on good 1 by
b. For this model, we can prove the following:
Proposition: If the production function for good 1 is more elastic than that for good 2,
then each period the most able people down to some constant over time threshold
ability level A1 become entrepreneurs in sector 1, the next range of ability down to a13
constant over time A, become entrepreneurs in sector 2. and the least able people
become workers.
The most able people are all drawn into the sector with less diminishing returns
(higher elasticity of output with respect to labor), because they run larger firms there
and so can spread their ability advantage over a larger scale. The quasi rents
accruing to talent are higher in that sector. Productivity in each sector grows at the
rate given by the ability of the most able entrepreneur in that sector, which of course
is higher in sector 1. The real wage grows at the rate g =aA11, which is the
weighted average of productivity growth rates in the two sectors. At the same time,
the price of good 1 fails over time relative to that of good 2, since technological
progress is faster in sector 1. The fall in the relative price of good 1 exactly offsets
the increase in the relative productivity, so that in equilibrium revenues and profits in
each sector grow at the same rate g as do the wages. Because revenues, profits, and
wages all grow at the rate g, the cutoff ability levels A1 and A2 between sectors
remain constant over time.
There is a stark inefficiency in this model. At the social optimum, the most able
person becomes an entrepreneur in one sector, and the second most able person in
the other sector. That way both sectors' productivity grows at the maximum possible
rate. In equilibrium, however, the second most able person would rather be in the
sector with less rapidly diminishing returns, since the first one captures only a small
part of that sector and there is still more money for the second most able person to
make in this than in the other sector. Each person is quasi-rent seeking, and quasi
rents on ability are higher in sector 1. As a result, all the most able people become
entrepreneurs in sector 1, where the externality from all of them other than the most14
ableis zero. In contrast, the person generating the externality in sector 2 is much less
able, and as a result that sector's productivity grows at a much lower rate. The
pursuit of quasi rents by the able people unbalances growth of the two sectors, with
theresultthat one grows inefficiently slow.
This inefficiency is much more general than our model, in which only the most
able person determines the rate of technological progress, would suggest. Obviously,
the result that people of comparable ability bunch into the same sector does not
depend on the form of externality. So unless such bunching generates the maximum
externality, there will be an inefficiency. We see no reason why bunching of people
of comparable ability into the same sector is optimal, so many types of externality
generate an inefficiency. For example, if the externality depends on the average or
i￿ia1 ability of entrepreneurs in a given sector, it may still be efficient to have very
similar distributions of abilities in the two sectors. One can argue perhaps that there
is an agglomeration economy of people with comparable abilities working in the same
sector, and that the pace of innovation depends on that. In this case, one would want
many innovators of comparable ability working together. But again, there is no
reason to think that the number of people needed to take advantage of the
agglomeration economy is as large as this model would put into the same sector, or
that the agglomeration economy is the highest in the sector where the most talented
people go. The equilibrium we have is inefficient, except by coincidence. Of course,
the inefficiency is smaller when individuals have comparative advantage at working in
particular sectors or when there are increasing returns to agglomeration of talent.
The most able people tend to flow into a sector where they can spread their
ability advantage over the largest scale. In the model, this means that they run the15
largest firms in the economy, a prediction that seems patently false. We have
assumed in this model that the compensation arrangements enable the most able
people to collect full quasi rents from their talents (though none of the future rents
because of perfect imitation). If this is not the case in some sectors, the most able
people would move into sectors where they collect the most even if firms are smaller.
The reason that people cannot collect full quasi rents have to do with imperfect
contracting and problems of allocating output to individuals. The allocation is then
determined by the compensation contract, and not just by technology.
In fact, differences in contracts between industries are probably as important or
more important than physical diminishing returns to scale. In industries where it is
easy to identify and reward talent, it might be possible to pay the able people the
true quasi rents on their ability and so to attract them. This is probably true in
industries at the early stages of their development, where able people can start and
run firms rather than work as part of a team. Perhaps the reason the auto industry
attracted enormous talent when it started but attracts much less talent now is that
talent was easier to identify and reward then. Starting one's own company is
obviously the most direct way to capitalize on one's talent without sharing the quasi
rents. Talent will then flow into industries where it is easy to start a firm, which
would be newer and less capital-intensive industries. Also, talent will flow into sectors
with less joint production, so it is easier to assign credit and reward contributions.
Finally, the most talented people will not go into activities where horizontal equity
and other ethical considerations prevent them from capturing the quasi rents on their
ability. Meritocracy is an obvious attractor of talent.
We emphasize that what matters for the allocation of talent is the relative16
rewards in different sectors. If all sectors tax quasi rents to ability equally, then
obviously the compensation contract will not make any of them more attractive. This
logic also suggests that there are two ways for a particular sector to be attractive to
the high ability people. The first is for this sector to have attractive compensation
contracts; the second is for the other sectors to have unattractive contracts. For
example, the reason that more talented people might become inventors in Japanese
manufacturing might not be that they are particularly well rewarded there, but rather
that compensation in law or government is even less attractive. Alternative
opportunities are thus a key determinant of the allocation of talent.
The Cobb-Douglas assumption on preferences gives the result that the allocation
of talent across sectors is constant over time. If we relaxed this assumption, the
allocation of talent would change over time and the analysis would become more
complicated. The Cobb-Douglas assumption also has the unfortunate implication that
the ioftechnology in a sector does not affect who goes into it. There is thus no
sense in which the most talented people are attracted to "hot" sectors that experience
a technology shock or a price rise (although of course the sector to which the best
people go grows faster). To analyze how the allocation of talent might change in
response to such shocks, in order to explain for example the U. S. experience in the
1970s and 1980s, we need to depart from the simple framework. Below we consider
one plausible framework and look at the static allocation problem rather than a
growth model.
Consider a one-period model with 2 sectors with prices p1 and p2 <p1and
identical production functions. In our current model this could not be an equilibrium
since all entrepreneurs would rather be in sector 1 than in sector 2. But suppose that17
there are only a fixed number of firms n1 in sector 1 and n, in sector 2 and there is
no free entry. Then entrepreneurs bid for the opportunity to run the firms and the
owners of these firms earn quasi rents on their fixed factor. The equilibrium is easy
to describe. The most able n1 people go into sector 1, the next n2 go into sector 2,
and the rest become workers. Let the ability of the least able entrepreneur in sector
1 be A1 and that of the least able entrepreneur in sector 2 be A2. The entrepreneur
with ability A2 earns w A2, and the rest of his profits go to the fixed factor in
sector 2. Siniiiarly, the least able entrepreneur in sector 1 earns what the most able
entrepreneur in sector 2 does, and the rest of his profits go to the fixed factor in
sector 1.
In this equilibrium, the more able people enter the hotter sector with the higher
price, and free entry does not make them indifferent between sectors. The reason
that the more able people end up in the hotter sector is that they bid more for the
fixed factors because it is worth more to them to gain access to these factors. The
fixed factors get the rents of the least able people gaining access to them, just as in
Ricardo, and the more able people earn quasi rents on their ability as well.
We describe this extension for two reasons. First, it explains why the implausible
feature of our basic model, namely that the level of technology does not affect the
allocation of talent, is not really a problem. More importantly, this extension helps
explain some episodes of why changes in particular sectors can attract a different type
of talent into that sector. Suppose that there is a technological improvement in some
sector, say financial services, and so the output per unit of ability in that sector rises
sharply. Suppose also that demand is elastic, and that the number of firms in that
sector is fixed in the short run. In this case, we might see that the ability of people18
moving into this sector rises, since they are able to profit the most working in a scarce
number of firms. By doing so, they would pay the most to the owners of those firms
for the privilege of working there. Without free entry, we would see thatsome of the
benefits of the productivity increase would go to the firmowners, and some to the
new employees who can produce the most.
When the ability of the most talented employees joining a sector rises,so does
technological progress in that sector. This illustrates an important positive feedback
in this model: when a sector with elastic demand experiences apositive technology
shock, it attracts better talent and so technology improves further. Such continuation
of the original innovation or other rent-creating shock through attraction of talent
describes growth of many industries [Porter, 1990]. This modelmight explain, for
example, the enormous technological progress in the U. S. financial services in the
1980s, after deregulation.
ILL Rent Seeking and Growth
In this section, we introduce rent seeking into the 1-sectorgrowth model. We
have described rent seeking in detail in the introduction; herewe simply take it to be
a tax on the profits of the productive sector. Specifically, we assume that when an
entrepreneur earns a profit y, T .yis taken away by rent seekers through bribes,
taxes, fees, and other costs of doing business in a rent-seeking society. We assume
that T is exogenous. One might argue in contrast that theamount of rent seeking is
a function of the level of development, so that T is a function of the level of income
or the stability of government [Olson, 1982]. For simplicity, we assume that there is
no productive component to rent seeking; it is therefore not a completely accurate19
description of financial services, law, or organized religion. We assume that rent
seekers tax profits rather than all income, includingwages, to simplilS' the analysis.
This assumption leads to a distortion of allocation ofpeople between
entrepreneurship and work, but to no distortion in the size of the firm once aperson
becomes an entrepreneur. Of course, some taxes, such as the famousgrowth tax in
India which imposes a penalty on revenue increases beyonda certain rate, distort the
size of the firm as well [Little, Mazumdar, and Page,1987].
The rent-seeking technology is also subject to increasingreturns to ability and
diminishing returns to scale. We assume that the rents collected by aperson with
ability A are given by




where H is the total human capital or ability of others that thisrent seeker employs,
y is the aggregate profits of the entrepreneurs, andG(H) is the concave production
function in the rent-seeking sector. In this specification, the share of totalgross rents
T Y collected by the rent seeker of ability A isproportional to A• (3(H). Total
gross rents collected by the rent seekers thus automatically add up to the total
revenues lost by the entrepreneurs. We assume for simplicity that there is no
technological progress in rent seeking. This assumption allows us to keep the model
homogeneous in the state of technology s. The rent-seeking technology, like the
productive technology, allows more able people to earn higher profits at a fixed size
H as well as to expand H to maximize profits. In thisrespect, rent seeking is similar
to entrepreneurship.20
Each person now has three choices: entrepreneurship, work, and rent seeking,
and he picks the most attractive option. If it is one of the former two, he also sets
the size of the firm. In equilibrium, the wage adjusts until the combined demand for
workers by the productive and the rent-seeking sector is equal to the supply of
workers
(7) f H(A)f(A)dA +fH(A)f(A)dA =fAf(A)dA
rent seekers entrepreneursworkers
We consider two cases. In the first, the production function (F) for output is
more elastic with respect to H than the production function (0) for rent seeking; in
the second it's the other way around. The results are similar to those of the two-
sector model. In the first case, the most able people go into the productive sector
where firms are the largest, the next group goes into rent seeking, and the least able
become workers. The cutoff ability levels are constant because the model is
homogeneous in the level of technology s and so the allocation decision is the same
each period. In this case, the level of technology s, productivity, wages, profits, and
aggregate returns to rent seekers all grow at the rate a--the ability of the most able
person in the economy. The growth rate is optimal since this person is an
entrepreneur. However, the level of income is lower than it would be without rent
seeking. First, some workers are allocated to the rent seeking rather than productive
sector and as a result output is foregone. Put differently, demand for workers in the
rent-seeking sector drives up wages and so reduces equilibrium employment in the
productive sector. Second, the less able entrepreneurs become rent seekers, and so
do not organize production. Although this does not lead to the reduction in the
growth rate, it leads to a once-and-for-all reduction in the level of income.21
The situation is worse when the production function for rent seeking is more
elastic and so the most able people become rent seekers since firms (correcting for
compensation contracts) are the largest in that sector. The next group becomes
entrepreneurs and the least able are workers. Now output grows at a lower rate than
a, since the most able entrepreneur is no longer the most able person available. We
now have three distortions from rent seeking. It absorbs labor, it distorts the choice
of least able entrepreneurs who now become workers, and finally, it turns the most
able people, who are pivotal for growth, into rent seekers. The model thuscaptures
the crucial point that rent seeking can reduce growth. (and not just the level of
income) because it attracts potential innovators and entrepreneurs. As the ability of
the most able person who becomes an entrepreneur falls, so does the growth rate.
This model makes several interesting predictions. First, suppose the tax rate T
on entrepreneurial profits falls. This fall can correspond to the improvement in the
property rights as suggested by North and Thomas (19731, but also to a reduction in
corruption or in taxes. The first direct effect of this fall is to reduce the size of the
rent-seeking sector. Workers move out of this sector and into production. Also, in
the case where the most able people are entrepreneurs, the most able rent seekers
move out and become entrepreneurs since incentives for this activity have improved.
Although the growth rate in this case remains at a, the level of income jumps as
resources move from rent seeking into entrepreneurship and production.
The case where the most able persons were rent seekers is different. As the tax
rate T falls, the least able rent seekers become entrepreneurs, and so the ability of
the best entrepreneur rises. As a result, not only does the level of income jump, but
the growth rate increases also as the person determining the growth rate oftechnology is now more talented. This result demonstrates perhaps the most
important cost of a large rent-seeking sector (high T). By drawing people out of
entrepreneurship and into rent seeking, it reduces the growth rate of the economy
permanently. The result also demonstrates how a one-time reduction in the extent of
rent seeking can permanently raise the growth rate of the economy. Barro [1989]
finds that countries with smaller government consumption relative to GDPgrow
faster, which is what our theory would predict if government consumption was a
measure of the tax rate T.
In this model, changes in the tax rate T do not affect whether the most able
person is an entrepreneur or a rent seeker. The reason is that the most able person
has the strongest comparative advantage at being in the sector that he isin, and so is
the last to switch. For example, as T rises, there is moreentry into the rent-seeking
sector but the entry is by people who have the least attachment to other sectors. This
entry drives down the returns without affecting the allocation of inframarginal people.
Where the most able person goes is determined in the modelonly by the relative
elasticity of the two production functions, or how fast the diminishing returns set in
the two activities. Since the career choice of the most ablepeople determines the
growth rate, how fast returns to scale diminish in entrepreneurship and in rent
seeking is one of the key determinants of growth.
More generally, the allocation of talent betweenentrepreneurship and rent
seeking is determined by market size and by the nature of contracts as well as by firm
size (diminishing returns to scale) in the twotypes of activities. The puzzle that must
be addressed is why, in most countries and times, talented individuals chooserent-
seeking activities, and the entrepreneurial choice is a fairly rare exception. Rent23
seeking seems to have an inherent advantage as a career choice. Table I summarizes
some characteristics of countries and markets that influence the allocation of talent; in
the following we try to discuss why the choice is so often rent seeking.
Rent-seeking activities are attractive when the potential amounts to be taken are
large. When the "official" rent-seeking sectors such as the government, religion, or
the army are big and powerful, the resources (and power) that a talented person gets
by joining them and succeeding are large. As a result, these sectors attract talent. In
such countries, the official institutions have well-defined property rights over private
wealth. Because the "official" rent-seeking institutions are and have been extremely
powerful in most countries, this type of rent seeking often attracts talent.
Countries with poorly defined property rights also attract talent into rent seeking,
since success at redefining these property rights brings high rewards. Rent steking
pays because a lot of wealth is up for grabs. In these cases, rent seeking is
"unofficial" and takes the form of bribery, theft, or litigation. In the United States
today, lobbying to influence the Congress and litigation are examples of this activity,
which is so attractive because the redistributed wealth is enormous. Inmany
countries, such "unofficial" rent seekers are official agents of the government, who use
their official positions to collect unofficial rents. Customs officials in Equatorial
Guinea take a cut of meat and liquor imports allegedly to "inspect" them. Like the
"official" rent seeking, "unofficial" rent seeking outcompetes entrepreneurship for
talent when wealth available for taking is larger.
Importantly, rent seeking unlike entrepreneurship usually deals with capital and
other forms of wealth, which rent seekers fight over. Entrepreneurship typically
allows the innovator to capture a portion of a market for some period of time, which24
is in most cases much less lucrative than getting one's hands on a piece of the
country's wealth. Moreover, a country with large wealth but slow growth is especially
attractive for rent seeking. The reason is that new goods often have more than
unitary income elasticity of demand, and therefore future growth is essential for the
profitability of innovation. Slow growth then reduces the attractiveness of innovation
and entrepreneurship. This logic suggests that the productivity growth slowdowncan
be self-sustaining: as talent leaves entrepreneurship and growth slows, the returns to
entrepreneurship fall further relative to those to rent seeking. We thus expect rent
seeking to prosper in countries with substantial wealth and slow growth, such as the
United States and Argentina today.
Feasible firm size, broadly interpreted, also often benefits rent seeking at the
expenses of entrepreneurship. When rent seekers such as government officials or the
military have substantial authority and discretion, they can expand their operations
and collect larger sums unhindered by law or custom. In this respect, poorly defined
property rights are responsible not just for large potential markets for rent seeking,
but also for the ability of rent seekers to run larger "firms."
In entrepreneurship, physical diminishing returns to scale are only one limitation
on firm size. In many less developed countries, legal restrictions on entry and on
expansion, such as industrial capacity licensing, are a government-imposed limitation
on firm size that makes entrepreneurship less attractive. Access to credit is also a
crucial determinant of feasible firm size, and therefore of the attractiveness of
entrepreneurship. Because rent seekers themselves often limit the ability of
entrepreneurial firms to expand to maximize their own income, high returns to rent
seeking often go with low returns to entrepreneurship. Entry and capacity25
restrictions, for example, invite bribes. In contrast, in countries where firms can easily
organize and expand with few constraints from the state and from the capital markets,
entrepreneurship will be attractive to the most talented relative to rent seeking.
When rent seekers tax entrepreneurs by limiting firm expansion, the most able
entrepreneurs suffer and the best potential entrepreneurs become rent seekers.
Perhaps the single most important determinant of the allocation of talent is the
compensation contract. The ability of rent seekers to keep a large chunk of the rents
on their talents, whether legally or illicitly, raises the attractiveness of rent seeking. In
many countries, official positions come with a territory of being able to collect bribes.
People pay hundreds of thousands of dollars for positions with the power to allocate
supposedly free water to farmers in India, since these jobs give them monopoly rights
to charge for water. Tax farmers throughout history bid fortunes for positions. Illegal
rent seeking is the most attractive when it is protected by the state. What
distinguishes these rent-seeking activities is that, at the margin, rent seekers can keep
all or most of the return from their ability.
In market rather than official rent seeking, such as some forms of law and
speculation, the output of rent seeking is often easily observable, and therefore can be
rewarded. This might not be true in entrepreneurial jobs where the inventor cannot
start his own firm but must work as part of a team in a large firm. In mature
manufacturing industries in the United States, for example, it is extremely hard to
identify individual contributions and to reward them accordingly even if they are
identified. The difficulty of observing output might drive the potential entrepreneurs
out of such industries and into rent seeking. The observability of output and the
possibility of rewarding talent is probably the most important reason why so many26
talented people go into rent seeking in theUnitedStates today.
To summarize, talent in the rent-seeking sectors in many countries benefits from
property rights that enable rent seekers to claim a substantial chunk of the productive
output through official and unofficial expropriation. As talent joins the rent-seeking
sectors, it expands and improves them. The higher taxes on productive activities
reduce the returns to entrepreneurship, and drive even more talent into rent seeking.
Large rent-seeking institutions and weak rent-protecting institutions draw talent out of
entrepreneurship. One benefit of the shrinking rent-seeking institutions, such as the
decline of central government, is that talent moves into productive activities. As the
New York Times described Hungary's move to capitalism, "Government now has to
compete with business for talented workers."
In some countries, entrepreneurs have managed to at least in part avoid the tax
from rent seekers by becoming rent seekers themselves. In these countries, it is
common for government officials to own businesses run either by themselves or by
their relatives, and to protect these businesses from competition or from bribes by
virtue of their government positions. Misallocation of talent nonetheless persists,
since a large chunk of these people's time is spent in rent-seeking activities designed
to foster their own businesses at the expense of those of the competitors.
Our model has one additional interesting implication. Suppose that the most
lucrative sector for the most talented is rent seeking and that there is a dominant
group in the population that has access to that sector. Suppose this group now
excludes some ethnic or racial minority from access to the rent-seeking sector, such as
the army or the government. In this case, the most able people from the excluded
group must go into other sectors, one of which might very well be entrepreneurship.27
If the exclusion is effective, and if the overall distribution of abilities is the same for
each group, this means that the ability of the most able entrepreneurs rises. The
growth rate of the economy then also rises as a result of this exclusion. Moreover,
exclusion of others benefits the dominant group, both because it leaves them a
greater share of the rent-seeking pie, and because the size of that pie rises as the
quality of entrepreneurship improves. Competition for the rent-seeking positions may
in part explain why Jews have been excluded from many rent-seeking occupations in
Europe, the Chinese in Malaysia, and the Indians and Lebanese in Africa. Faster
growth can be one of the few inadvertent benefits of discrimination in rent seeking.
Of course, discrimination against minorities in entrepreneurship hurts both them and
the majority.
N. Some Evidence
A major implication of our paper is that the allocation of talented people to
entrepreneurship is good for growth, and their allocation to rent seeking is bad for
growth. Unfortunately, it is hard to directly measure the allocation of talent to these
two types of activities. Barro [1989] provides some evidence that high government
consumption and a high number of coups, which might both measure the extent of
rent seeking, have a negative effect on growth, but this finding is too indirect. An
alternative approach is to associate individual occupations with entrepreneurship and
rent seeking. Magee, Brock, and Young [1989] have in fact found data on the
number of lawyers in thirty-five countries, and found that countries with more lawyers
grow slower. We have found data on the numbers of people in different occupations
in different countries, but instead used data on college enrollments in different fields28
for a large cross-section of countries collected by UNESCO. We use the data on
college enrollment in law as a measure of talent allocated to rent seeking, and on
college enrollment in engineering as a measure of talent allocated to
entrepreneurship. Although lawyers do different things in different countries, and
undergraduate enrollments might not be a good proxy for the extent of each activity,
these are the best measures of rent seeking and entrepreneurship we could find.
We use Barro's [1989] data set that augments the Summers and Heston [1988]
data base.Infact, we frame our analysis as an extension of Barro's regressions. The
variables we use for each country are the growth rate of real GD?percapita
between 1970 and 1985, real GD?percapita in 1960,averagefrom 1970 to 1985 of
the ratio of real government consumption (exclusive of defense and education) to real
GD?, primary school enrollment rate in 1960, average from 1970 to 1985 of the ratio
of real private investment to real GDP, and the number of revolutions andcoups.
Although these are not all of Barro's variables, they are the most important ones, and
include measures of general investment in human capital (primary education), in
physical capital (private investment), and of government consumption.
We add to Barro's list the ratio of college enrollments in law to total college
enrollments in 1970, and the same ratio for engineering. The reason that we choose
total enrollments rather than population or population of a given age as a
denominator is that we are interested in the allocation of the most able people
between fields. Fractions of college enrollment in law and engineering in fact
measure the incentives to be in these fields as opposed to being in college more
generally. Looking at the ratios to population would tell us less about the allocation
of the most able people and more about incentives to go to college. The intersection29
of the sample of countries for which data on college enrollments by field are available
for 1970 with Barro's 98 country sample for which data on investment and
government consumption are available yields 91 observations.
We run the regressions first for all 91 countries in the sample, and then for the
55 countries that have more than 10,000 college students. The idea of looking at
countries with more than 10,000 students is to reduce the problem of college
attendance abroad. We found this approach preferable to running population-
weighted regressions since some large population countries have a significant
commitment to education abroad. In addition, the subsample with large college
enrollments gets rid of some smaller countries which probably have less reliable data,
and might be preferred for this reason as well. Table II presents the summary
statistics for the engineering and law variables in the total and the restricted sample.
Table III presents the basic results of the regression of 1970 to 1985 growth rate
on law and engineering enrollments, controlling only for the 1960 GDP. In the
regression for all countries, we find a positive and significant effect of engineers on
growth, and a negative and basically insignificant (t =1.2)effect of lawyers on
growth. The signs of the coefficients are consistent with the theory that rent seeking
reduces growth while entrepreneurship and innovation raise it. If an extra 10 percent
of enrollment was in engineering, which corresponds roughly to doubling average
engineering enrollments, the growth rate would rise 0.5 percent per year. If an extra
10 percent were in law, which also roughly corresponds to doubling enrollments,
growth would fall 0.3 percent per year. If we look at countries with large student
populations, the effect of engineers more than doubles and becomes more significant.
The negative effect of lawyers also doubles, but remains insignificant. The R-squared30
of the second regression is a lot higher as well.
Of course, we cannot interpret these relationships as structural, since law and
engineering enrollments might be correlated with other sources of growth.
Accordingly, we next consider the Barro regression augmented by our law and
engineering variables, and then decompose the reduced form effects on law and
engineering on growth into direct effects and indirect effects operating through
correlation with other variables.
Table IV presents the results of the augmented Barro regression for the whole
and the large college population samples. In both regressions investment inphysical
and in human capital increase gro'vth, while government consumption and revolutions
reduce growth. There is also some evidence of convergence as in Barro,although it
is not clear that it makes sense to define convergence holding investment constant.
The direct effects of lawyers and engineers are very insignificant in the wholesample,
with the sign on engineers switching to negative. In contrast, the direct effect of
engineering in the reduced sample is still positive and almost significant, although it
falls to under half of the total effect in Table III. More surprisingly, the direct effect
of lawyers is negative and significant in the reduced sample, and its absolute value is
higher than in the whole sample. Based on this sample, Table IV confirms the direct
negative relationship between rent seeking and growth, and the direct positive
relationship between entrepreneurship and growth.
The positive direct effect of engineers, and the negative direct effect oflawyers,
are consistent with our theory, which says that the rate of technologicalprogress is
determined by the allocation of talent. If engineering is an attractive major, the
quality of talent in engineering is higher, therefore entrepreneurs are of higher31
quality, the rate of technological progress is greater, and the growth rate of GD? per
capita is higher. This argument of course assumes a positive correlation between the
fraction of college majors in engineering and the rate of technological progress that
they will generate and does not deal with the abilities of engineers. Similarly, if law is
an attractive major, the quality of rent seekers is higher, and hence, indirectly, the
quality of entrepreneurs is lower and technological progress and income growth are
smaller. Of course, there may be other mechanisms that explain these direct effects,
and our theory also predicts that there may be indirect effects of the allocation of
talent on growth. For example, less rent seeking and more technological progress are
likely to raise physical investment.
To decompose the total effect of lawyers and engineers on growth from
Table III into the direct and indirect effects, Table V presents the estimates from
auxiliary regressions of Table IV independent variables (investment, primary
education, government consumption, and revolutions) on lawyers and engineers. In
all these regressions, we control for 1960 real GD?. High engineering enrollments
predict high investment in pure and physical capital, low government consumption and
low revolutions and coups. This suggests that some of the effect of engineers on
growth comes from the fact that countries with many engineering majors also do
many other things that are good for growth, such as educate the young and
accumulate capital. They also avoid things that are bad for growth, such as
government consumption and revolutions. Our engineering variable might be a proxy
for good incentives and the efficiency of allocation on a variety of margins.
In contrast to the finding for engineers, the correlations between Table IV
independent variables and law enrollments are weak and insignificant. To our32
surprise, lawyers do not have a significant negative effect on investment, which they
would if rem seekers specialized in redistribution of physical capital. The results
suggest that most of the effect of lawyers on growth is direct.
Table VI decomposes the total effect into the direct and the indirect effects.
For engineers, the direct effect on growth is trivial for the whole sample, but about
half of the total for the reduced sample. As we mentioned, this direct effect is
consistent with the view that allocating good people to entrepreneurial activities is
good for growth. In both samples, the indirect effects are large because engineering
enrollments are strongly positively correlated with investment in physical and human
capital, which are positively correlated with growth, and negatively correlated with
government consumption, which is negatively correlated with growth. This result
suggests that in countries that invest and have a good labor force attract their able
people into engineering as well, and that as a result of this allocation of resources
they grow. They do all the right things at the same time. They also avoid high
government consumption, which discourages engineering majors, as well as reduces
growth. Avoiding revolutions does not discourage engineering concentrators, and so
there is no indirect effect there. Our results suggest, not surprisingly, that people
choose the engineering major when other conditions in the economy make investment
in industry-related human capital attractive.
The indirect effects of law enrollments on growth are all trivial. By far the main
effect is direct, which in the reduced sample is even larger in magnitude than the total
effect. This evidence from the reduced sample might mean that the most important
effect of lawyers on growth is the opportunity cost of not having talented people as
innovators. The small indirect effect suggests that lawyers reduce growth creating33
activities but not through reducing the incentives to invest.
In summary, the sample with large college enrollments reveals a large direct and
large indirect positive effect of engineers on growth, and a large direct negative effect
of 1ayers on growth. One, but not the only one, interpretation of these findings is
that the allocation of talent is important for growth. The allocation of talent into
engineering seems to occur in countries that also invest in human and physical capital,
suggesting that some countries just do things right.
V. Conclusion
Among the many explanations of the recent U. S. productivity growth slowdown,
two deal with human capital. The first is that the quality of the U. S. human capital
stock is not growing as fast as it used to, or perhaps is even deteriorating. The poor
qualityofschools, the declining test scores, and even the declining relative wages of
high school graduates [Murphy and Welch, 1988]suggestthat this might bea
problem. The second explanation is that human capital is allocated improperly for
growth, and in particular the most able young people become rent seekers rather than
producers. The fact that many of the most talented young people become lawyers
and security traders is cited as evidence for this explanation.
In this paper, we have presented some theoretical reasons why the second
concern might in fact be important, and some empirical evidence that suggests that
this concern might be real. Lawyers are indeed bad, and engineers good, for growth.
This suggests that private incentives governing the allocation of talent across
occupations might not coincide with social incentives. Some professions are socially
more useful than others, even if they are not as well compensated. The findings on34
engineers also suggest that countries that have many engineering majors also invest in
human and physical capital. We do not know what is theexogenous cause of these
relationships. However, it is quite possible that policies that raise investment or
improve the quality of human capital will indirectly make engineering a more
attractive career, and in this way increase growth.35
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Large resources go to
"official" rent-seeking
sectors, such as the
government, army, or religion.
Poorly defined property rights
make wealth accessible to
"unofficial" rent seekers.
Large wealth which is up for
grabs, especially relative to
smaller goods markets.
Substantial authority and
discretion of rent seekers
(such as government officials,
army, etc.) enable them to
collect large sums unhindered
by law or custom.
Ability to keep a large chunk
of collected rents. In firms,















rents by rent seekers.
Ability to start firms
to collect quasi rents
on talent.38
Table II
Sumxnazy Statistics for Engineering and Law Major
as Percentage of College Students
Countries with
Full sample 10.000ormore students
Engineering Engineering
Mean 10.39 8.89 12.03 7.25
Median 9.08 5.52 10.25 5.61
25th percentIle 3.83 2.65 7.26 3.10
75th percentile 14.31 11.20 15.92 10.0539
Table ifi
Regressions of Growth of Real GDP Per Capita between 1970
and 1985 on Proportions of Majors in Engineering and Law






Law -0.03 1 -0.065
(0.025) (0.049)





Determinants of Growth Rate of Real GDP Per Capita










Revolutions and -0.028 -0.035
coups (0.009) (0.009)










Regressions of Table II Independent Variables on Proportions
of Majors in Engineering and Law




















Revolutions and -0.121 0.141
coups (0.248) (0.597)
N 91 55
SampJe Ail 10,000 Students42
Table VI
Decomposition of the Effect of Engineering andLawMajors
on Growth into Direct and Indirect Effects


















Revolutions and 0.004 -0.005
coups
Direct -0.024 -0.078
Total -0.031 -0.065